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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
EARL ALLEN v. STEPHEN L. HARDY ET AL. 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED 
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
No. 85-6593. Decided June-, 1986 
PER CURIAM. 
In 1978, petitioner Earl Allen, a black man, was indicted 
for murdering his girlfriend and her brother. During selec-
tion of the petit jurors at petitioner's trial, the prosecutor 
exercised 9 of the State's 17 peremptory challenges to strike 
7 black and 2 Hispanic veniremen. Defense counsel moved 
to discharge the jury on the ground that the "'State's use of 
peremptory challenges undercut [petitioner's] right to an im-
partial jury selected from a cross-section of the community 
by systematically excluding minorities from the petit jury.'" 
People v. Allen. 96 Ill. App. 3d 871, 875. 422 N. E. 2d 100. 
104 (1981). The trial judge denied the motion. The jury 
convicted petitioner on both counts, and the judge sentenced 
him to two concurrent prison terms of from 100 to 300 years. 
On appeal, petitioner repeated his argument concerning 
the State's exercise of peremptory challenges. Rel};ng on 
Swain v. Alabama. 380 U. S. 202 (1965). and on Illinois case 
law decided under Swain. the Illinois Appellate Court 
rejected the argument. The court reasoned that in the 
absence of a showing that prosecutors in the jurisdiction 
systematically were using their challenges to strike members 
of a particular racial group, "a prosecutor's motives may not 
be inquired into when he excludes members of that group 
from sitting on a particular case by the use of peremptory 
challenges." 96 Ill. App. 3d, at 875, 422 N. E. 2d. at 104. 
The record in this case did not establish systematic exclusion 
as required by Swain. /d., at 876, 422 N. E. 2d, at 104. 
The court therefore affirmed petitioner's convictions. I d., at 
880, 422 N. E. 2d, at 107 . 
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ALLEN II, HARDY 
Petitioner then filed a t't' 
lief in the District C .tt 1 1011 for federal habeas corpus re-
on which he renew do~~ or the Northern District of Illinois, 
of peremptot ch e JS argument c~ncerning the State's use 
1 . 1 ""! allenges. Construmg this at·gument as al-e:~l:~;~ Y ~hat .P~osecutor~ in. the jurisdiction systematically ""· 
. . ~mon~tes from Junes, the District Court denied 
petl.tiOner .s mot10n. ~or discovery to support the claim, and 
demed rehef. PetltJOner's failure at trial "to make even an 
offer .of proof" to satisfy the evidentiary standard of Swain 
constituted a procedut·al default for which petitioner had of-
fered no excuse. 577 F. Supp. 984, 986 (ND Ill. 1984); sec 
583 F. Supp. 562 (ND Ill. 1984). In a subsequent opinion, 
the District Court also considered and rejected petitioner's 
contention that the State's exercise of its peremptory chal-
lenges at his trial violated the Sixth Amendment. 586 F. 
Supp. 103~4-106 (1984). Moreover, noting that the Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit had "twice within the past 
60 days reconfirmed the continuing validity of Swain," the 
decision on which the orders in this case rested, the District 
Court declined to issue a certificate of probable cause. 
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal, which the Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit construed as an application 
for a certificate of probable cause to appeal. Finding that 
petitioner failed to make a "substantial showing of the denial 
of a federal right" or that the questions he sought to raise 
"deserve[d] further proceedings," the court. denied the 
request for a certificate of probable cause. 
In his petition for certiorari, petitioner argues that the 
Court of Appeals' refusal to issue a certificate of probable 
cause was erroneous in view of the fact that Batson v. Ken-
tucky, 476 U. S. -- (1986), was pending before us at the 
time of the Court of Appeals' decision. The thrust of peti-
tioner's argument is that the rule in Batson should be avail-
able to him as a ground for relief on remand. We conclude J 
that our decision in Batson should not be applied retroac-
ALLI•; N t• IIJ\ltDV :\ 
tin•Jy 011 COIJatt.•J•:tl I'L'Vl 'W (' , . . 
fon• om· 0 in · l ° CotWtcltnnH that bt•t•:mw final be 
1 I . r lOll WaH :\llllOUlll'l'ti, and Wl' t hen• ron• '\l'linn 1 
n c l'<'H. Ill.~. t ht• l'Xi<'lll to whil'h a d<'<'iHion ·mnt.nmcin.v, '\ lll~W <.'<>ttt~tttutt~m;tlt·ul<• of ct·imiual pt·ot·l·dun• :,\l;oul<l be v,ivP~\ 
•:P n>ac JH' t•ftct't. the <.. 'mut lt·nditionnlly hat-~ Wl'i~lwd thn•c 
tact or~. Th<•v 'll'<' .. '(· ) tl • 
. • .1 1<' PIII'JHIH<' to be :o~t•rvcd by Lhc new standanl~ (b) til" l'Xt<'tlt l(' tl J' b 1 ·. 
. • ' '" · ( H' l'l' IHI\Ct' Y HW l'lll<WCt'll\Pill at~t~ontt~'R on the old statulanls, aud (l') u; ... l•ITt•d on Llw ad 
UlUH~tratwn of ju.stic<.' of:\ l'{~tmal'liVl' upplit-ation nf I lw tll'W 
standm·d.s."' Solem v. Sttwtc~. 4G5 U . H. u:~H. ().\a (tmH) 
(q.uoting StoN11/ v. D<'uno, :lHH u. 8. ~n:~. ~n7 (1BH7)); Rcc l~mklcftt•J· v. Walkt•t, :381 U. s. H tH, Han (H)( if>). While a dc-
ciHion on t·ctroactivity t'<'quircs t•an•fnl l'Ou:.;idl•t·at.ion of all 
thrNl critet·ia, the Court has held thn.t n deci:.;ion announdng-
a tww ~tandm·d "i~ almo~t automatically nom·Ptrom·tiv<.•" 
where the dc<:iHion "ha:.; explicitly ovenulc;i pllirt'prccc<l<.·nt." 
Solt'm v. Slunu's, .•wpta, at ().Hi, H·l7. The ntlc in 8ut~o11 v. / 
Kentucky i~ an t•xplicit and sub~tantial br<'ak with prior 
p1·ecedent. In Swain v . . ·\labcww, tlw Cmu-t hl'ld that. al-
though the u~c of pl'I'CmptoJ·y challeng-es to st 1·ikc blaek ju-
rors on account uf race violated the F~qual P1·ot t!dion Clau~l:, 
a def(111dant rould not establish such a violation solely on 
proof of the p1·osccutm·'s a<.'t ion at his QWn trial. aHO U. H .• 
at 220-226. Ual:wn oveJ'I'Ul<.>d that portion of Stm.iu. <.'hang- / 
ing the standard fm· proving uncon:.;tituUonal ahust• of pe-
remptory challenges. Against that bacl<grouncl, Wt' considl'l' 
whether the standard announced in Uatsu11 ~hould lw avail· 
able on habcaH review of petitionct·'H mm·dt!t' <:onvictionH. 
'
11By final wt• mt'llll wht•t't' tht• judgnwnt of t•nu\'id ion wng l'l'lldt•J'I'd, t ht• 
availability nfapp('al t•xhaustt'd, and t.lw timt> for pt>tiliun 1'<11' t•t•rtiur:u·i ha<l 
elapsc•d bcfor(• out· df•tiHion in" 1/ttl.•wn v. 1\rnluck!/. /,lltk/,•ff,•r v. \Valkt•r, / 
:~1 (). S. fHH, fi~~. n. r; ( WfiG). W t.' l'XJll't!HH no vit·w nn llw qut•Ht inn \ 
wh<!thcr our dt•ciHion in llttfson Hhoulcl lw applit•tl to t•mws that wt•t't' twncl -
ing on dirc•t·t nppt•al at Uw tinw cnu· clt•t·ision wa1-1 annouru.~t·cl. Ht•P Urlj)itlt 
v. Kntlurky, No. H!) f,~~l (c«'rt. grantt•cl .hull• :!, HIHCi), antl Hm/1'11 v. 





ALLEN v. HARDY 
The first factor concerns the 
new rule. Retroa t· ~ . purpose to be served by the 
c Ive e.uect Is "a . t h constitutional princi 1 . d . ppropr1a e w ere a new 
criminal trials " S l p e Is esigned to enhance the accm:ac~ <>f 
that a rule m;, o em v. St~mes, supra, at 643, but the fact 
d Y have some Impact on the accuracy of a trial 
oes not compel a finding of retroactivity. I d., at 643-645. In~tead ~ the purpose to be served by the new standard 
weighs m favor of retroactivity where the standard "goes to 
the ~eart of ~h~ truthfinding function.'' I d., at 645. By ser~g a crlllllnal defendant's interest in neutral jury ~election procedures, the rule in Batson may have some bear- I 
mg on the truthfinding function of a criminal trial. But the 
decision serves other values as well. Our holding ensures 
that States do not discriminate against citizens who are sum-
moned to sit in judgment against a membe"r of their own race 
and strengthens public confidence in the administration of 
justice. The rule in Batson, therefore, was designed "to 
serve ID.!illiPJe ends," only the first of which may have some \ 
impact on truthtinding. See Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U. S. 
323, 329 (1980); see also Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 
382 U. S. 406, 414 (1966). Significantly, the new rule joins 
other procedures that protect a defendant's interest in a neu-
tral factfinder. 2 Those other mechanisms existed prior to 
our decision in Batson, creating a high probability that the 
individual jurors seated in a particular case were free from 
bias. Accordingly, we cannot say that the new rule has such .; 
a fyndam.ental impact on the integrity of factfinding as to 
compel retroactive application. 
Moreover, the factors concerning reliance on the old rule 
and the effect of retroactive application on the administration 
of justice weigh heavily in favor of nonretroactive effect. As 
2 Voir dire examination is designed to identify veniremen who are 
biased so that those persons may be excused through challenges for cause. 
Moreover, the jury charge typically includes instructions emphasizing that 
the jurors must not rest their decision on any impennissible factor, such as 
passion or prejudice. 
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noted above Batson not 1 standard of Swai ·t 1 on Y overruled the evidentiary significant! n, 1 a so announced a new standard that 
d {! d Y changes the burden of proof imposed on both 
e en ant ~nd prosecutor. There is no question that pros-
ecutors tr1al J. udges d 11 ' , an appe ate courts tlu·oughout our 
state and fe?eral systems justifiably have relied on the stand-
ard of Swa-m. 3 Indeed, the decisions of the Illinois Appel-
late Court affirming petitioner's convictions and of the Dis-tri~t Court denying habeas corpus relief clearly illustrate the 
reliance lower courts placed on Swain. Under these circum-
stances, the reliance interest of law enforcement officials is 
"compelling" and supports a decision that the new rule should 
not be retroactive. Solem v. Stumes, supra, at 650. 
Similarly, retroactive application of the Batson rule on col-
lateral review of final convictions would seriously disrupt the 
administration of justice. Retroactive application would re-
quire trial courts to hold hearings, often years after the con-
viction became final, to determine whether the defendant's / 
proof concerning the prosecutor's exercise of challenges es-
tablished a prima facie case of discrimination. Where a de-
fendant made out a prima facie case, the court then would be 
required to ask the prosecutor to explain his reasons for the 
challenges, a task that would be impossible in virtually every 
case since the prosecutor, relying on Swain, would have had 
no reason to think such an explanation would someday be 
necessary. Many final convictions therefore would be 
vacated, with retrial "hampered by problems of lost evi-
dence, faulty memory, and missing witnesses.'' Solem v. 
Stumes, supra, at 650; see also Linkletter v. Walker, 381 
U. S., at 637. 
Our weighing of the pertinent criteria compels the conclu-
sion that the rule in Batson should not be available to peti-
1
The substantial reliance by lower courts on the standard in Swain has 
been fully documented elsewhere. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 
-, -, n. 1 0986); McCray v. Abrams, 750 F. 2d 1118, 1120, n. 2 (CA2 
1984), cert. pending, No. 84-1426. 
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tioner on federal habeas corpus review of his convictions. 
We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. ~ 
Affirmed. 
4 In his petition for certiorari, petitioner also argues that the District 
Court erroneously denied him discovery on his claim that prosecutors sys-
tematically had excluded minorities from petit juries in the jurisdiction. 
In effect, the District Court held that, by making no offer of proof on this 
claim, petitioner's bare objection failed to preserve the claim for review. 
Since petitioner points to no Illinois authority casting doubt on the District 
Court's conclusion that, at the least, an offer of proof was necessary to 
preserve the issue, we have no reason to question the District Court's con-
clusion that the claim was waived. Similarly, the District Court properly 
determined that petitioner was required to, and did not, establish cause 
and prejudice excusing his default. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72 (1977). 
